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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than i t  was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
1 - In t roduc t ion  
Deep relationships of some so r t s  between technical change and 
economic development a r e  now generally acknowledged in both economic 
history and economic theory. Still ,  the i r  na ture  i s  ma t t e r  of debate 
concerning t h e  precise causal links. For example, i t  i s  quite intuitive 
t h a t  improvements in the  efficiency of techniques of production o r  in 
product performances may be a determinant o r  a t  least  a binding 
precondition of growth in per capita incomes and consumption. But, 
intr icate debates concern "what ultimately determines what.. .": e.g. is  
i t  resource accumulation t h a t  primarily fos te r s  the  exploration of novel 
innovative opportunities, or ,  conversely, does innovation drive capital 
accumulation?; do new technological opportunities emerge mainly f rom an  
extra-economic domain ("pure science") o r  a r e  they primarily driven by 
economic incentives?; should one assume tha t  the  institutions supporting 
technical change a r e  sufficiently adaptive t o  ad jus t  t o  whatever 
underlying economic dynamics emerges f rom market interactions; or ,  
conversely, a r e  they inertial enough t o  shape the  r a t e s  and directions of 
innovation and diffusion? 
Clearly, these  and a few other,  related,  questions a r e  a t  the  core 
of many controversies regarding growth patterns:  f o r  example, i s  
convergence the  dominant tendency? How does one then in terpre t  observed 
phenomena of forging ahead o r  falling behind? I s  i t  legitimate t o  exclude 
f rom the  analysis a t  least  in a f i r s t  approximation the  specificities of 
institutions and corporate organizations? Even more so, al l  these 
questions and controversies underlie the  political economy of 
development. 
Obviously, one would not do justice t o  these in t r ica te  questions in 
a single paper even if one had achieved thorough answers  ( t h a t  indeed one 
i s  f a r  f rom having). However, there  has been over a t  leas t  the  l a s t  two 
decades a flourishing of studies on the  sources, mechanisms and pat terns  
of technological innovation. And, the  opening of the  technological 
blackbox has  often gone together with important insights into 
innovation-driven market competition. Business historians have finally 
achieved some cross-fertilization with (some breeds of)  economic 
theorizing. And the  institutional understanding of the  socio-economic 
fab r i c s  of contemporary societies starts showing f ru i t fu l  complementaries 
with other analyses stemming f rom the  economists quar ters .  
Quite a f ew of these contributions have been proposed by scholars 
who would call themselves evolutionists o r  institutionalists. Many, 
o thers  have come within d i f ferent  theoretical perspectives. Still ,  t he re  
is  a sense t h a t  these diverse s t reams of research show a f ew common 
threads,  highlighting -to paraphrase Richard Nelson- t h e  CO-evolution o f .  
technologies, corporate organizations and institutions. 
These threads  -linking evolutionary analyses of t h e  microeconomics 
of innovation all t he  way t o  (daring) generalizations on some invariant 
f ea tu res  of the  process of development- a r e  the  subjec t  of th i s  paper. 
Far  from being a comprehensive survey, i t  is  r a the r  a s o r t  of "roadmap" 
with an  inevitable degree of idiosyncrasy. 
We start by discussing the  theoretical implications of what  we know 
about the  often patterned dynamics of innovative activities at a micro 
level. The notions of technological paradigms, t r a j ec to r i e s  (and largely 
overlapping ones such as dominant designs) entail a representat ion of 
technologies centered on t h e  cognitive and problem-solving procedures 
which they involve. 
Another major  implication of th is  view is  in t e rms  of theory of 
production. I t  is  r a the r  straightforward t o  derive some s o r t  of 
non-substitution properties, in the short-term, and, a lso  in t h e  
long-term, technological asymmetries o r  gaps a s  permanent f ea tu res  across  
f i rms  and, even more as ,  across countries. 
Do these  micro technological properties bear consequences at broader 
levels of observation, i.e. whole industrial sec tors  and whole countries? 
Or, putt ing i t  another way, can one identify invariances and pa t t e rns  a t  
sectoral  o r  national level which can be interpreted in t e r m s  of some 
underlying specificities in the  processes of collective learning, market  
selection and institutional governance of both? 
This is  the  subject  of the  second p a r t  of the  paper, and i t  is  also 
where the  roadmap inevitably bifurcates into d i f ferent  discourses. Some 
will be persued in reasonable detail and while o thers  will only be 
sketched out, jus t  flagging the  elements of consistency with the  r e s t  of 
the  argument. For example, there  a r e  sound theoretical reasons and a 
growing empirical evidence t h a t  the  observed pat terns  of evolution of 
industrial s t ruc tu res  a r e  the  outcome of specific modes of access t o  
innovative opportunities and market selection mechanisms. However, we 
shall not dwell here on th is  aspect  of the  co-evolution between 
technologies and production structures.  Rather, more at tention shall be 
devoted t o  the  links between micro learning and economy-wide accumulation 
of technological capabilities and, in part icular ,  t o  the  existence of 
specific national system of production and innovation. The argument needs 
t o  be built through several steps. F i rs t ,  i t  follows f rom the  
microeconomics of innovation t h a t  f i rms  a r e  central ,  albeit  by no means 
unique, repositories of technological knowledge. Hence, also the i r  
specific organizational and behavioral f ea tu res  a f f e c t  the  r a t e s  and 
direction of learning. Second, f i rms  characterist ics a r e  not randonly 
distributed across  sec tors  and across  countries. On t h e  contrary,  
part icular  t r a i t s  tend t o  be reinforced through thei r  interactions with 
the  environment in which they a r e  imbedded. Third, broad institutional 
mechanisms of governance of interactions f u r t h e r  enhance the  possibility 
of collective lock-in into part icular  modes of learning. Somewhat in 
analogy with the  earl ier  microeconomic analysis we shall call these  
pat terns  as national t rajectories.  
Fa r  f rom reviewing an  immense historical evidence on these  issues, 
we shall only d raw f rom selected examples f rom developed countries and, 
in part icular ,  f rom a somewhat archetypical comparison between t h e  
experiences of Latin America and the  Asian Fa r  East. 
Along th i s  tour & fo rce  f rom micro technological s tudies t o  the  
political economy of development, we shall on purpose r a i se  many more 
questions than we shall able t o  answer. The major t a sk  here  is  t o  show 
tha t  they can be consistently linked together in a broadly defined 
evolutionary interpretation. 
2 - The  f u n d a m e n t a l  p r o p e r t i e s  of  technology 
Technological  paradigms and t r a j e c t o r i e s  
A variety of concepts have recently been put fo rward  t o  define the  
nature  of innovative activities: technological regimes, paradigms, 
tra iectories. salients, guideposts, dominants designs and s o  on.The names 
are not so  important (although some standardization could make t h e  
diffusion of ideas easier!). More crucially, these concepts are highly 
overlapping in t h a t  they t r y  t o  capture a f ew common fea tu res  of t h e  
procedures and direction of technical change ( fo r  a discussion and 
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references, see  Dosi (1988)). Let us  consider some of them . 
1 In the  following, we shall' stick t o  the  categories of pa rad igms  and 
t r a j ec to r i e s ,  but the  reader who i s  fond of other names should st i l l  
recognize familiar  ideas. 
The notion of technological paradigms is based on a view of 
technology grounded on t h e  following th ree  fundamental ideas. 
F i rs t ,  i t  suggests t h a t  any sat isfactory description of "what i s  
technology" and how i t  changes must also embody the  representation of the  
specific fo rms  of knowledge on which a part icular  activity i s  based. 
Putting i t  more emphatically, technology cannot be reduced t o  the  
standard view of a s e t  of well-defined blueprints. Rather, i t  primarily 
concerns problem-solving activities involving - to varying degrees- also 
t ac i t  forms of knowledge embodied in individuals and organizational 
procedures. 
Second, paradigms entail specific heuristic and visions on "how t o  
do things" and how t o  improve them, often shared by the  community of 
practi t ioners in each part icular  activity (engineers, f i rms,  technical 
societies, e tc) ,  i.e. they entail a collectively shared cognitive f r ames  
(Constant (1985)). 
Third, paradigms generally also define basic models of a r t i f a c t s  and 
systems, which over t ime a r e  progressively modified and improved. These 
basic a r t i f a c t s  can also be described in terms of some fundamental 
technological and economic characteristics. For example, in the  case  of 
an  airplane, these basic a t t r ibutes  a r e  described not only and obviously 
in t e rms  of inputs and the  production costs, but also on the  basis  of 
some sal ient  technological fea tures  such a s  wing-load, take-off weight, 
speed, distance i t  can cover, etc. What i s  interesting i s  t h a t  technical 
progress seems t o  display pat terns  and invariances in t e rms  of these 
product characterist ics.  Similar examples of technological invariances 
can be found e.g. in semiconductors, agricultural  equipment, automobiles 
and a f ew other micro technological studies. 
The concept of technoloaical t ra jec tor ies  i s  associated t o  the  
progressive realization of the  innovative opportunities associated with 
each paradigm, which can in principle be measured in t e rms  of t h e  changes 
in the  fundamental techno-economic characterist ics of a r t i f a c t s  and the  
production process. The core ideas involved in th i s  notion of 
2 t ra jec tor ies  a r e  the  following . 
This interpretat ion of technical change and a number of historical 
examples can be found in pioneering works on economics of technical 
change such as those by Chris Freeman, Nathan Rosenberg, Richard Nelson, 
Sidney Winter, Thomas Hughes, Paul David, Joel Mokyr, Paolo Saviotti  and 
others; see  f o r  a par t ia l  survey Dosi (1988). 
Firs t ,  each part icular  body of knowledge (i.e. each paradigm) shapes 
and constrains the  r a t e s  and direction of technological change 
irrespectively of market inducements. Second, as a consequence, one 
should be able t o  observe regularities and invariances in t h e  pa t t e rn  of 
technical change which hold under different  market conditions (e.g. under 
different  relative prices) and whose disruption is  correlated with 
radical changes in knowledge-bases (in paradigms). Third, technical 
change i s  part ly driven by repeated a t tempts  t o  cope with technological 
3 imbalances which i t  itself c rea tes  . 
A general property, by now widely acknowledged in the  innovation 
l i te ra ture ,  i s  t h a t  learning i s  local and cumulative. Local means t h a t  
t h e  exploration and development of new techniques i s  likely t o  occur in 
the  neighborhood of the  techniques already in use. Cumulative means t h a t  
current  technological development -at  least  at t he  level of individual 
business units- of ten  builds upon past  experiences of production and 
innovation, and i t  proceeds via sequences of specific problem-solving 
junctures (Vincenti (1992)). Clearly, th is  goes very well together with 
the  ideas of paradigmatic knowledge and the  ensuing t ra jec tor ies .  A 
crucial implication, however, is  t h a t  at any point in t ime t h e  agents 
involved in a part icular  production activity will f a c e  l i t t le  scope f o r  
substitution among techniques, if by tha t  we mean the  easy availability 
of blueprints d i f ferent  f rom those actually in use, which could be put  
efficiently into operation according t o  relative input prices. 
Technological dominance, micro heterogeneity and non-substitution 
The notion of paradigms contains elements of both a theory of 
production and theory of innovation. In shor t ,  we shall call i t  
henceforth a n  evolutionary theory. Loosely speaking, we should consider 
such a theory at t he  same level of abstract ion as ,  say, a Cobb-Douglas 
production function o r  a production possibility set.  That  is, al l  of them 
a r e  theories of what  a r e  deemed t o  be some stylized but  fundamental 
4 f ea tu res  of technology and, relatedly, of production process . 
This i s  akin t o  the  notion of reverse sal ients  Hughes (1992) and 
technological bottlenecks Rosenberg (1976): t o  i l lustrate,  think of 
increasing the  speed of a machine tool, which in tu rn  demands changes in 
cutt ing materials, which leads t o  changes in o ther  p a r t s  of the  
machine.. . 
Few believe t h a t  a production possibility s e t  literally exists. Many 
would however probably maintain t h a t  such a notion enhances the  
In f a c t ,  one f inds  a few remarkable assumptions underlying 
conventional production theories. A s  already mentioned, technologies -a t  
least  in a f i r s t  approximation- a r e  seen as a s e t  of blueprints 
describing al ternative input combinations. Moreover, at any one t ime 
the re  must be many of them, in order t o  be able t o  in terpre t  empirical 
observations as t he  outcome of a microeconomic process of optimal 
adjustment t o  relative prices. Information about these blueprints i s  
generally assumed t o  be freely avaiable (except those circumstances 
whereby they a r e  privately appropriated via the  patent  system). Finally, 
one assumes t o  be able t o  separa te  the  activities leading t o  t h e  
eff icient  exploitation of existing blueprints f rom those leading t o  the  
development of new ones (exogeneity of technical progress i s  i t s  extreme 
version). Of course, th i s  is  only a trivialized account of a family of 
models t h a t  can be made much more sophisticated, by e.g. adding detai ls  
on how blueprints a r e  ordered with respect  t o  each other (more 
technically, issues like continuity and convexity come under th i s  
heading). However, i t  s t i l l  seems f a i r  t o  say t h a t  t h e  basic vision of 
production -also carr ied  over in aggregate growth and development models- 
focuses on questions of choice among well defined techniques, generally 
available t o  all producers, who also know perfectly well what  t o  do with 
al l  t he  recipes when they see  them. 
Well, t o  put i t  very strongly, the  theory of production based on 
paradigms develops on nearly opposite theoretical bulding blocks. And 
indeed many of t h e  l a t t e r  yield empirically testable hypotheses. 
Here, we shall argue t h a t  a paradigm-based theory of technology may 
perform t h e  same interpret ive tasks,  at the  same level of generality, and 
do i t  be t ter ,  in the  sense t h a t  i t  i s  more in tune with microeconomic 
evidence and also directly links with theories of innovation. Our theory 
would predict the  following. 
a)  In general,  t he re  is  at any point in t ime one o r  very f e w  best 
practice techniques which dominate the others irrespectively of relative 
prices. 
b )  Different  agents a r e  characterized by persistently diverse 
(bet ter  and worse) techniques. 
c) Over time t h e  observed aggregate dynamics of technical 
understanding of the  observed technical coefficients in t h e  economy and 
also how they change over time. We claim the  same f o r  t h e  evolutionary 
theory. 
coefficients in each part icular  activity is  the  joint outcome of the  
process of imitation/diffusion of existing best-practice techniques, of 
the  search  f o r  new ones, and of market selection amongst heterogeneous 
agents. 
d )  Changes over t ime of the  best practice techniques themselves 
highlight r a t h e r  regular  paths (i.e. t ra jec tor ies)  both in the  space of 
input coefficients and also in the  space of t h e  core technical 
characterist ics of outputs (see the  earl ier  example on a i r c ra f t s ) .  
A representation o f  production and techno1 ogical activities 
Let us f u r t h e r  i l lustrate the  previous points with a graphical 
example. 
S t a r t  f rom the  notion t h a t  each technical coefficient observed at 
t he  microlevel i s  the  outcome of codified information (something 
resembling blueprints), but  also of more t ac i t  and f i r m  specific fo rms  of 
knowledge. Suppose tha t ,  f o r  the  sake of simplicity, we a r e  considering 
here the  production of an  homogeneous good under constant  r e tu rns  t o  
5 
scale with two variable inputs only, x l  and x2  . 
A paradigm-based theory of production predicts tha t ,  in genera1,in 
the  space of unit inputs, micro coefficients a r e  distributed somewhat as 
depicted in Figure 1. Suppose t h a t  at time t t he  coefficients  a r e  
cl.. .cn; where 1.. .n a r e  the  various techniques/firms labelled in order  
of decreasing efficiency at time t. I t  i s  s t ra ight forward t h a t  
technique/firm cl i s  unequivocally superior t o  the  o ther  ones no ma t t e r  
what  relative prices are:  i t  can produce the  same unit output with less 
inputs of both x l  and x2. The same applies t o  the  comparison between c3 
and cn, etc. .. 
Let us call t h i s  property technolo~ical  dominance, and call some 
measure of the  distribution of the  coefficients across  heterogeneous 
f i rms  as t he  degree of asymmetry of t h a t  industry ( fo r  example, the  
standard deviation around the  mean value C). 
The f i r s t  question i s  why doesn't f i r m  n adopt technique cl? To 
simplify a more art iculated argument (see Freeman (19821, Nelson and 
Winter (19821, Dosi (1988) and Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (19901, Winter 
(198211, the  answer i s  "because i t  does not know how t o  do i t  ..." .That  
Note t h a t  f ixed inputs, vintage e f fec t s  and economies of scale would 
jus t  s trengthen t h e  argument. 
is,  even if i t  is  informed about the  existence of c l ,  i t  might not have 
the  capabilities of developing o r  using it. Remarkably, th is  might have 
l i t t le  t o  do with the  possibility f o r  c l  t o  be legally covered by a 
patent. The arguinent is  much more general: precisely because 
technological knowledge is  part ly taci t ,  also embodied in complex 
organizational practices, etc.,  technological lags and lead may well be 
persistent even without legal appropriation. The opposite also holds: if 
t he  two f i rms  have similar technological capabilities, imitation might 
occur very quickly, patent  protection notwithstanding, by means of 
"inventing around" a patent ,  reverse engineering, etc.. 
W e  a r e  prepared t o  push the  argument fu r the r  and suggest t h a t  even 
if f i r m  n were  given all t h e  blueprints of technique c l  (or ,  in a more 
general case, also all t he  pieces of capital equipment associated with 
i t ) ,  performances and thus  revealed input coefficients might s t i l l  widely 
differ .  Following R. Nelson, i t  is  easy t o  i l lustrate th i s  by means of a 
gastronomical metaphor: despite readily available cooking blueprints and, 
indeed, also codified rules on technical procedures, unavailable in most 
economic representat ions of production ("...first heat  the  oven, then 
a f t e r  around ten  minutes introduce some specified mixture of f lour  and 
butter , .  . . etc" 1, one obtains systematically asymmetric outcomes in t e rms  
of widely shared s tandards  of food quality. This applies t o  comparisons 
among individual agents and also t o  institutionally differentiated groups 
of them: f o r  example, we a r e  ready t o  bet  t h a t  most e a t e r s  randomly 
ext rac ted  f rom the  world population would systematically rank samples of 
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An lllustratlon 
English cooks t o  be "worse" than French, Chinese, Italian, Indian, ... 
ones, even when performing on identical recipes!!. If one accepts t h e  
metaphor, th i s  should apply, much more so, t o  circumstances whereby 
performances result  f rom highly complex and opaque organizational 
routines (Incidentally, Leibenstein's X-efficiency r e s t  also upon th i s  
widespread phenomenon). 
Suppose now t h a t  at some subsequent t ime t' we observe t h e  
distribution of microcoeff icients 12'3..  .c'm. How do we in terpre t  such a 
change? 
The paradigm-based s tory  would roughly be the  following. At t ime t ,  
al l  below-best-practice f i rms  t r y  with varying success t o  imitate 
technological leader(s). Moreover, f i rms  change the i r  market shares ,  some 
may die and other may enter: all th is  obviously changes the  weights (i.e. 
t h e  relative frequencies) by which techniques/firms appear. Finally, at 
least  some of the  f i rms  t r y  t o  discover new techniques, prompted by t h e  
perception of innovative opportunities, irrespectively of whether 
relative prices change o r  not ( fo r  the sake of illustration, in f igure  1, 
f irm-3 succeeds in leapfrogging and becomes the  technological leader 
while firm-m now embodies the  marginal technique). 
How do relative prices f i t  into this  picture? 
In a f i r s t  approximation, no price-related substitution among 
firm-known blueprints occurs at all. Rather, changes in relative prices 
primarily a f f e c t  both the  direction of imitation and the  innovative 
search by bounded-rational agents. However, t he  paradigm-based s tory  
would maintain tha t ,  even if relative prices change significantly, the  
direction of innovative search and the  resulting t ra jec tor ies  would 
remain bounded within some relatively narrow paths  determined by the  
nature  of the  underlying knowledge base, the  physical and chemical 
principles i t  exploits, t he  technological systems in which a part icular  
activity i s  embodied. Sti l l  more importantly, persistent  shocks on 
relative prices, or ,  f o r  t h a t  mat ter ,  on demand conditions, a r e  likely t o  
e x e r t  irreversible e f fec t s  on the  choice and relative diffusion of 
al ternative technological paradigms, whenever such an  al ternative exists ,  
and, in the  long term, focus the  search f o r  new ones. 
In a extreme synthesis, a paradigm-based production theory suggests  
as t he  general case , in the  shor t  te rm,  fixed-coefficient 
(Leontieff-type) techniques, with respect t o  both individual f i rms  and 
industries, t he  l a t t e r  showing ra the r  inertial averages over 
heterogeneous f irms.  In the  longer te rm,  we should observe quite 
patterned changes, often only loosely correlated with the  dynamics of 
relative prices. 
In f ac t ,  t he  available evidence -admittedly sca t tered ,  due also t o  
the  economists propensity t o  avoid disturbing questions- is  consistent 
with these  conjectures: there  appear t o  be wide and persistent  
asymmetries in efficiency among f i rms  within the  same industry (cf. f o r  a 
survey and discussion Nelson (1981). This applies t o  developed countries 
and, more so, t o  developing ones. Moreover, persistent  asymmetries appear 
also in prof itability (Geroski and Jaquemin (1988). Muller (1990). 
Finally, several industrial case studies highlight technology-specific 
regulari t ies in the  pat terns  of technical change hardly interpretable as 
direct  responses t o  changes in relative prices and demand conditions: in 
th i s  respect, t he  case of the  semiconductors (Dosi (1984)) is  only a n  
extreme example of a more general phenomenon. 
Let us now expand the  space over which technologies a r e  described 
and include, in addition t o  input requirements, also t h e  core 
characterist ics of process and ar t i fac ts ,  hinted earlier: e.g. wing-load, 
t ake  off weight etc. in airplanes; circuit density, processing speed in 
semiconductors; acceleration, fuel  consumption in automobiles; etc. The 
conjecture is  t h a t  also in th i s  higher-dimension space, t r a j ec to r i e s  
appear and t h a t  discontinuities a r e  associated with changes in knowledge 
bases and search heuristics. Indeed, the  evidence put fo rward  by e.g. 
Devandra Sahal and, more recently, by Paolo Saviotti  at Manchester 
University show remarkable regularities in the  pat terns  of change within 
the  space of core product characteristics: f o r  example, in commercial 
a i r c ra f t s ,  one can observe a well defined t r a j ec to ry  leading f r o m  the  
DC-3 t o  contemporary models. (Interestingly, models which tu rn  ou t  t o  be 
technological o r  commercial fa i lures  often happen t o  be f a r  f rom the  
t r a j ec to ry  itself 1. 
These findings bear implications also f o r  the  economic analysis of 
the  relationship between supply and demand dynamics. S t a r t  f rom a 
Lancasterian view of f inal  demand (i.e. consumers demand character is t ics  
which sa t i s fy  the i r  "needs"). With rising incomes and heterogeneous 
preferences, one might have expected product variety t o  grow and be 
distributed over the  whole space of characterist ics.  In f a c t ,  one 
obviously observe an  enormous product variety. However, at a closer look, 
i t  appears t h a t  product innovation explore only a minor sub-set of such a 
space. Putt ing i t  differently, the  nature of each paradigm appears  t o  be 
a powerful f ac to r  binding the  variety in t h e  technical f ea tu res  and 
performances of observed products. 
Technical change, international asymmetries and development 
Naturally, t he re  i s  an  alternative interpretat ion of al l  the  
evidence discussed so  f a r  drawing on standard production theory. Let US 
consider once more Figure 1. Take f o r  example the  average technical 
coefficient C at time t by reading i t  from published industrial 
s tat is t ics.  Assume by definition tha t  C i s  the  equilibrium technique 
(whereby average and best practice techniques nearly coincide). 
Relatedly, draw some generic and unobservable downward-sloped curve 
through C (say, in Fig.1 the  I1 curve) and also t h e  observed relative 
price ratio. Do the  same with point C' corresponding t o  t h e  average 
values at t ' ,  and again with the  subsequent average observations. Next 
assume a part icular  functional form t o  the  unobserved curve postuled t o  
pass through C, C', C" ..., etc. and call i t  t he  isoquant of a 
corresponding production function. (The same method can be applied, of 
course, over t ime o r  cross-sectionally). Then, run some econometric 
est imates based on such postulated function, using d a t a  derived f rom the  
time-series of relat ive prices and C, C', ... Finally, in terpre t  t h e  
relationship between the  values of the  estimated coefficients in te rms of 
elasticities of substitution (i.e. some notional movement along the  I1 
curve, as equilibrium responses t o  relative price changes), and a t t r ibute  
t h e  residual variance t o  a d r i f t  in the  technological opportunity set ,  as 
represented by the  movement from I1 t o  I'I', etc.. 
For the  purpose of th i s  argument, one can neglect whether such a 
d r i f t  is  meant t o  be an  exogenous time-dependent dynamics -as in 
Solow-type growth models-, o r  i s  in turn  the  outcome of some higher level 
production function of blueprints -as in many new growth models. In any 
case, if -for  whatever reasons- relative prices present  some 
intertemporal regulari ty and s o  do pat terns  of technological search  ( fo r  
example because they follow paradigm-driven t ra jec tor ies) ,  then one i s  
likely t o  f ind a good s ta t i s t ica l  f i t  t o  the  postulated model, even when 
no causal link actually exis ts  between distributive shares  and fac to r  
intensities. This i s  a well established point, convincingly argued in 
different  perspectives by F. Fischer, R. Nelson, L. Pasinett i ,  A. Shaikh, 
H. Simon. Even if t h e  evolutionary microdinamics described above were the  
t r u e  one, one could st i l l  successfully undertake the  s tandard  s ta t i s t ica l  
exercise of f i t t ing  some production function. But t h e  exercise would in 
f a c t  obscure r a the r  than illuminate the  underlying links between 
technical change and output growth. 
Take the  illustration of Fig 1 and suppose t h a t  the  evidence does 
not r e fe r  t o  two distributions of micro-technical coefficients over t ime 
within the  same country, but instead t o  two countries at t he  same time: 
a f t e r  all,  paraphrasing Robert Lucas, we only need informed tour is ts  t o  
recognize t h a t  most countries can be ranked in t e rms  of unequivocal 
average technological gaps. With some additional assumptions on the  
nature  of production function, one can st i l l  claim t h a t  C, C', etc. 
remain equilibrium realizations of country-specific allocation processes. 
Conversely, in the  context of an  evolutionary approach, one would 
suggest -as we do- t h a t  optimizing choice among technical al ternatives 
commonly shared by al l  agents in the two countries have l i t t le  t o  do with 
al l  this, and t h a t  one should r a the r  look f o r  an explanation of such 
inter-national differences within the  process of accumulation of 
technological competence and also within the institution governing market  
interaction and collective learning. The contras t  between (imperfect)  
learning optimal allocation of resources as the  fundamental engine of 
development has  indeed been repeatedly emphasized among others  by Kaldor, 
Pasinetti  and earl ier  by Schumpeter , but t o  our knowledge, no-one has  
yet  fully explored i t s  consequences f o r  the  theory and policy of 
development. Needless t o  say, we a r e  dramatizing t h e  differences. Af ter  
all,  learning i s  intertwined with the  process of resource allocation. 
Still ,  i t  i s  useful t o  distinguish between what i s  assumed as having 
f i r s t  order  o r  second order effects .  
All th i s  has also an  empirical counterpart: indeed, the  economic 
discipline has undertaken f a r  too few exercises at the  highest available 
disaggregation on international comparisons among sectoral  technical 
coefficients. Our conjecture i s  tha t ,  at th is  level, one could observe a 
good deal of evidence conflicting with the  standard theory of production: 
less developed countries may well show higher utilization of al l  o r  most 
inputs per  unit of output and perhaps even higher relative intensity of 
those inputs t h a t  the  theory would consider more scarce  ( tha t  is ,  some 
loose equivalent of what  euphemistically the  economic profession calls  in 
international t r a d e  the  Leontieff paradox). Conversely, an  evolutionary 
interpretat ion is  s traightforward:  unequivocal technological gaps account 
f o r  generalized differences in input efficiencies. Moreover, if technical 
progress happens t o  involve also high r a t e s  of saving in physical capital 
and skilled-labour inputs, one may also observe less developed countries 
which do not only use more capital per  unit of output but also more 
capital per  unit of labour input a s  compared t o  technological leaders 
(Figure 1 i l lustrates a similar case: compare f o r  example, techniques c '3  
and cn). 
Some important implications emerge from th i s  approach. 
Fi rs t ,  t he  theory would predict persistent asymmetries among 
countries in the  production processes which they a r e  able t o  master  ( th is  
of course also shows up in terms of different  inputs efficiencies: see  
Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990)). Thus, a t  any point in time, one can draw 
two major  testable conjectures: ( i )  different  countries might well be 
unequivocally ranked according t o  the  efficiencies of the i r  average 
techniques of production and, in the  product space, of t h e  
(price-weighted) performance characterist ics of the i r  outputs, 
irrespectively of relative prices, and ( i i)  t h e  absence of any 
significant relationship between these gaps and international differences 
in the  capital/output ratios. Wide differences apply also t o  the  
capabilities of developing new products and t o  d i f ferent  t ime lags in 
producing them a f t e r  they have been introduced into the  world economy. 
Indeed, the  international distribution of innovative capabilities 
regarding new products is  a t  least  a s  uneven a s  t h a t  regarding production 
processes. For example if one takes  international patents  o r  t h e  number 
discrete innovation a s  a proxy f o r  innovativeness, t h e  evidence suggest 
t h a t  t h e  club of the  innovators has  been restr icted over the  whole pas t  
century t o  a dozen developed countries with only one major  new entry,  
Japan (more on the  evidence in Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990)). 
Second, t h e  process of development and industrialization a r e  
s t r ic t ly  linked t o  the  inter- and intra-national diffusion of "superior" 
techniques. Relatedly, as already mentioned, a t  any point in t ime,  there  
is  likely t o  be only one or ,  at most, very few "best practice" techniques 
of production which correspond t o  the  technological f ront ier .  In the  case 
of developing economies, the  process of industrialization is  thus  closely 
linked with the  borrowing, imitation, adaptation of established 
technologies f rom more advanced economies. These process of adoption and 
adaptation of technologies, in turn ,  are influenced by the  specific 
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capabilities of each economy . 
In th i s  context, we suggest t h a t  evolutionary micro-theories a r e  
Abramovitz notion of differentiated "social capabilities" is  quite 
consistent with th i s  view, Abramovitz (1989). 
well a p t  t o  account f o r  the  processes by which technological gaps and 
national institutional diversities can jointly reproduce themselves over 
r a the r  long spans of time. Conversely, in other circumstances, i t  might 
be precisely th is  institutional and technological diversity among 
countries which may fos te r  catching-up (and, rare ly  leapfrogging) in 
innovative capabilities and the per capita incomes. Rigorous 
demonstrations of these propositions would indeed require many 
intermediate steps,  linking the  externalities and positive feedback 
mechanisms based on technological learning with the  institutional context 
in which microeconomic agents a r e  embedded, and also the  economic signals 
they face.  We shall briefly come back t o  this  issue l a t e r  on. Here le t  us 
just  emphasize t h a t  systematically different  r a t e s  of learning may have 
very l i t t le  t o  do with "how well markets work". Rather, the  incentives 
and opportunities which agents perceive in a part icular  context a r e  
themselves t h e  result  of part icular  histories of technologies and 
institutions. 
The importance of the  institutional dimension f o r  evolutionary 
theories of production and innovation should come as no surprise,  
supported by a growing evidence f rom both micro and macro pat terns  of 
technological change. After  all, a t  the micro level, technologies a r e  t o  
a f a i r  extent  incorporated in part icular  institutions, the  f i rms,  whose 
characterist ics,  decision rules, capabilities, and behaviors a r e  
fundamental in shaping the  r a t e s  and directions of technological advance. 
In turn ,  f i r m s  a r e  embedded in rich networks of relat ions with each 
other and with other institutional ac to r s  -ranging f rom government 
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agencies t o  universities etc. . 
But how did part icular  technologies come into exis t  existence in the  
f i r s t  place? Let us tu rn  t o  th is  question. 
In th i s  co-evolutionary perspective on technologies, corporate 
organizations and institutions (Nelson (199411, i t  i s  s t ra ight forward t o  
acknowledge also a bi-directional relation between market s t ruc tures  (as 
proxied by measures on the  distribution of different  characterist ics such 
as f i r m  sizes, innovative competences, ownership, persistent  behavioral 
t r a i t s ,  e t c )  and pat terns  of technological learning. Different  r a t e s  of 
learning influence the ability of f i rms  t o  survive and expand and thus  
a f fec t  industrial s tructures.  Conversely any part icular  s t ruc tu re  -with 
i t s  associated distribution of corporate fea tures-  influences and 
constrains what and how f a s t  f i rms  a r e  able and willing t o  learn. Formal 
applications of th is  general idea a r e  in Nelson and Winter (19821, Winter 
(19841, Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo and Salvatore (1993). 
Economic and social factors in the emergence o f  new paradigms 
I t  is  useful t o  separa te  the  genesis of new paradigms f rom the  
processes leading t o  the  dominance of some of them. Let  us f i r s t  consider 
the  emergence of new potential paradigms; t h a t  is,  the  generation of 
notional opportunities of radical innovation involving new knowledge 
bases, new search heuristics, new dominant designs. 
In the  l i te ra ture  one find quite d i f ferent  interpretat ive 
archetypes. A f i r s t  class of models entails a lot of "techno- scientific 
determinism": advancements in pure science determine advancements in 
technological opportunities which in turn  determine realized 
technological achievements. In f ac t ,  in order  t o  find the  most naive 
l i te ra ture  along these lines one should mostly search in the  archives of 
defunct socialist countries. There, one i s  likely t o  find plenty of 
examples of Engels-type vulgata on the  simplest linear models f rom 
science t o  technology t o  production. 
The interpretat ion t h a t  s tudents of economics find in textbook 
production is  more sophisticated although basically of the  same type. I t  
maintains the  basic linear sequence f rom science t o  technological 
opportunities t o  production but i t  claims t h a t  science only generates 
those notional blueprints discussed earl ier ,  while some optimizing 
microeconomic algorithm selects  among them. Proper economic analysis 
begins indeed by s ta t ing  some daring assumptions on the  na tu re  of such 
blueprints which maintain in principle an  empirical na ture  albeit l i t t le  
empirical micro support (e.g. on continuity, convexity, etc.).  From then 
onward, production theory is  generally presented as an  application of 
methods of constrained maximization which intends t o  capture  t h e  
purposed behavior of the  homo economicus facing al ternative allocative 
choices, and most often,  also the aggregate propert ies of industries o r  
whole economies. 
Yet more sophisticated recent modelling on new-growth, new-trade 
theories, while attempting t o  endogenize the  generation of blueprints 
themselves, push fu r the r  upstream t h a t  same notional process of 
optimizing allocation involving some s o r t  of production function f o r  the  
blueprints themselves. This is  not the  place t o  discuss the  ( r a the r  
important)  achievements and the  (equally important) limitations of such 
theories. What we simply want t o  emphasize is  the  persistence across 
ample s t reams of micro and macro l i te ra ture  of two  basic ideas: f i r s t ,  
the  linear representation of the  innovative process, running f rom science 
t o  technology t o  production; and second, the  focus upon an  explicit 
deliberation, equivalent in every respect t o  a n  allocative choice, by 
supposedly rational agents. 
However, as Chris Freeman, Nathan Rosenberg, and others  have 
convincing shown, historical evidence rules out the general applicability 
of linear models of innovation. One can find plenty of counterexamples. 
First ,  t he  lag between scientific advancements and the i r  technological 
application can vary between a few months ( a s  in the  case  of the  
t rans is tor )  t o  centuries. Second, technological innovation may actually 
precede t h e  scientific discovery of the general principle on which those 
very technologies work (as in the  case of electr ic  lamps). Third, 
scientific advancements may actually be based on the  invention of new 
machinery and not  the  other way round (think of t h e  importance of the  
electronic microscopes f o r  the  subsequent scientific discoveries in 
8 biology) . 
A s  regards  the  behavioral foundations of innovative decisions, we 
a r e  quite skeptical about the i r  reduction t o  deliberate allocative 
choices. A s  emphasized not only by evolutionary economists by also by 
rational choice theor is ts  like K. Arrow, almost by definition innovation 
concerns t h e  generation of something new and at leas t  part ly unexpected. 
Relatedly, the  genesis of exploratory ventures into novel paradigms i s  
more the  domain of institutional and organizational inquiries on the  
conditions fas ter ing  entrepreneurial activities r a t h e r  than rat ional  
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choice models . 
Indeed, there  a r e  good reasons t o  believe t h a t  one will not be able 
t o  find anything like a general theory of the  emergence of new 
technological paradigms. However, what might be possible i s  a) a n  
analysis of the  necessary condition f o r  such emergence; b)  historical 
See Rosenberg (1991). 
Of course th is  i s  not t o  say t h a t  the  economic variables governing 
the  incentives and penalties t o  entrepreneurial endeavours a r e  
irrelevant. The point i s  t h a t  the  former tend t o  s e t  only some lose 
incentive-compatibility constraints. Given these  constraint ,  
explanations of willingness of incumbent f i rms  t o  explore new 
paradigms, of t h e  r a t e  of the  birth of new s t a r t -up  f i rms,  etc. 
requires a much more detailed understanding of specific corporate and 
institutional histories. Working backward from observed outcomes t o  
some rat ional  expectation model does not do the  trick: on the  
contrary,  the re  i s  even evidence tha t  in many new industries, had 
en t ran t s  rat ional  expectations of their  fu tu re  prof i t  s treams,  ent ry  
would not have occurred at all! ( th is  seems t o  emerge also f rom a 
research,  in progress, by Don Lovallo and Giovanni Dosi). 
taxonomies and also appreciative models of the  processes by which i t  
occurs; and c )  taxonomies and models of the  processes of competition 
amongst d i f ferent  paradigms and their  diffusion. 
Regarding the  f i r s t  heading, one is like t o  find t h a t  the  existence 
of some unexploited technological opportunities, together with t h e  
relevant knowledge base and some minimum appropriability conditions, 
define only the  boundaries of the  se t  of potential new paradigms: those 
which a r e  actually explored within th i s  s e t  might crucially depend on 
part icular  organizational and social dynamics. So f o r  example, the re  is  
good evidence t h a t  the micro electronics paradigm as we know i t  
(silicon-based. e t c  ) was shaped in i t s  early s tages  by military 
requirements (Dosi (1984). Misa (1985)). David Noble argues t h a t  the  NC 
machine-tool paradigm -although he does not use t h a t  expression- has been 
influenced by power considerations regarding labour management (Noble 
(1984)). In t h e  history of technology one f inds several examples of th i s  
kind. The general point i s  t h a t  various institutions (ranging f rom 
incumbent f i rms  t o  government agencies), social groups and also 
individual agents (including, of course, individual innovators and 
entrepreneurs)  perform as ex ante selectors of the  avenues of research 
t h a t  a r e  pursued, the  techno-economic dimensions upon which research 
ought t o  focus, the  knowledge base one calls upon. Thus, they ultimately 
select  the  new paradigms t h a t  a r e  actually explored. 
There i s  a much more general theoretical s to ry  regarding the  
development, diffusion and competition among those (possible al ternative) 
paradigms t h a t  a r e  actually explored. I t  can be told via explicit 
evolutionary models (as in Nelson and Winter (1982) o r  in Silverberg, 
Dosi and Orsenigo (1988)). via path-dependent stochastic models (as in 
Arthur (1988). Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1987). Dosi and Kaniovski 
(1994) and David (1989)). and also via sociological models of network 
development (as in Callon (1991)). The basic ingredients of the  s tory  a r e  
i )  some forms of dynamics increasing re turns  ( fo r  example in learning); 
ii) positive externali t ies in the  production o r  the  use of the  
technology; iii) endogenous expectation formation; iv) some market  
dynamics which selects  ex post amongst products, and indirectly amongst 
technologies and f irms;  v) t h e  progressive development of s tandards  and 
relatively inertial institutions which embody and reproduce part icular  
fo rms  of knowledge and also t h e  behavioral norms and the  incentives t o  do 
SO. 
3 Learn ing  a n d  t r a j e c t o r i e s  in t h e  process  of development  
Techno-economic paradigms o r  regimes: f rom micro  technologies  t o  
national  sys tems  of innovation 
So f a r ,  we have discussed paradigms, t ra jec tor ies  o r  equivalent 
concepts at a micro-technological level. A paradigm-based theory of 
innovation and production -we have argued- seems t o  be highly consistent 
with the  evidence on the  patterned and cumulative nature  of technical 
change and also with the  evidence on microeconomic heterogeneity and 
technological gaps. Moreover, i t  directly links with those theories of 
production which allow f o r  dynamic increasing re tu rns  f rom A. Young and 
Kaldor t o  t h e  recent  and more rigorous formalizations of path-dependent 
models of innovation diffusion, whereby the  interaction between micro 
decisions and some form of learning o r  some externali t ies produces 
irreversible technological paths and lock-in e f fec t s  with respect  t o  
technologies which may well be inferior, on any welfare measure, t o  other 
notional ones, but  s t i l l  happen t o  be dominant -loosely speaking- because 
of the  weight of the i r  history (cf. the  models by B. Arthur and P. 
David). However, paradigms a r e  generally embodied in larger  technological 
systems and in even bigger economic-wide systems of production and 
innovation. 
The s teps  leading f rom a microeconomic theory of innovation and 
production t o  more aggregate analyses a r e  clearly numerous and complex. A 
f i r s t  obvious question concern the  possibility of identifying relative 
coherence and s t ructures  also at these broader levels of observation. 
Indeed, historians of technology -T. Hughes, B. Gilles and P. David, 
among others- highlight the  importance of technological systems, t h a t  is  
in the  terminology of th i s  paper, s t ruc tured  combinations of micro 
technological paradigms (see f o r  example, the  fascinating reconstructions 
of the  emerging system of electrification and electrical s tandards  in 
David (1992)) 
A t  a n  even higher level of generality, Freeman and Perez (1988) have 
suggested t h e  notion of techno-economic paradigms as a synthetic 
definition of macro-level systems of production, innovation, governance 
of social relations. So, f o r  example, they identify broad phases of 
modern industrial development part ly isomorphic t o  t h e  notion of "regimes 
of socio-economic Regulation" suggested by the  mainly French macro 
institutionalists l i te ra ture  (see Aglietta (19761, Boyer (1988a and b)). 
In an  extreme synthesis, both prospectives hold, f i r s t ,  t h a t  one can 
identify ra the r  long periods of capitalist development distinguished 
according t o  thei r  specific engines of technological dynamism and thei r  
modes of governance of the  relationships amongst t h e  major social ac tors  
(e.g. f i rms,  workers, banks, collective political authori t ies e tc) ,  and, 
second, t h a t  the pat terns  of technological advancement and those of 
institutional change a r e  bound t o  be coupled in such ways a s  t o  yield 
recognizable invariances f o r  quite long times in most economic and 
political structures.  Just  t o  provide an example, one might roughly 
identify, over the  three  decades a f t e r  WW 11, across most developed 
economies, some "Fordist/Keynesian" regime of socio-economic 
"Regulation", driven by major innovative opportunities of technological 
innovation in electromechanic technologies, synthetic chemistry and 
relatively cheap exploitation of energy sources, and reproduced by some 
specific forms of institutional governance of industrial conflict, income 
distribution and aggregate demand management. Analogously, earl ier  in 
industrial history, one should be able t o  detect some sor t  of archetype 
of a "classical/Victorian Regime" driven in i t s  growth by the  full 
exploitation of texti le manufacturing and light engineering 
mechanization, relatively competitive labour markets, politically driven 
e f f o r t s  t o  expand privileged market outlets, etc.. 
These general conjectures on historical phases o r  regimes a r e  
grounded on the  importance in growth and development of specific 
combinations among technological systems and forms of socio-economic 
governance. The approach can be applied also t o  the analysis of the  
differences and similarities of development pat terns  in the  
late-industrializing countries. One has focused f o r  example on the  
interplay between the modes of governance of the  labour market and the  
pattern of technical accumulation, showing how the specificities in 
labour market institutions originate virtuous o r  vicious circles of 
10 development in different  historical periods . 
As an intermediate s tep  toward the  identification of national 
socio-economic regimes let us  consider the  anatomy and development of 
part icular  systems of innovation and production at national level, 
embodying distinctive mechanisms and directions of learning, and grounded 
in the  micro theory of production and innovation sketched above. 
lo See, Aboites (1988). Boyer (1993). Cetrangolo (1988a). (1988b). Cimoli 
(1988). (1990). Coriat and Saboia (1987). 
Even if micro paradigms present considerable invariances across  
countries, the  ways various paradigms a r e  combined in broader 
technological systems and, more so, in national systems of production and 
innovation highlight -we suggest- a considerable variety, shaped by 
country-specific institutions, policies and social fac tors .  The 
hypothesis here i s  t h a t  evolutionary microfundations a r e  a f ru i t fu l  
s t a r t ing  point f o r  a theory showing how technological gaps and national 
institutional diversities can jointly reproduce themselves over r a the r  
long spans of t ime in ways t h a t  a r e  easily compatible with t h e  pat terns  
of incentives and opportunities facing individual agents,  even when they 
tu rn  out  t o  be profoundly suboptimal from a collective point of view. 
In order  t o  detail t h i s  hypothesis, however, one requires t o  
analysis of the  composing elements and propert ies of these  nationa! 
systems which in t h e  recent  l i terature have been re fe r red  t o  with a 
variety of largely overlapping concepts, such as global technological 
capability of each country, national innovation systems, national 
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technological capabilities and national systems of production . 
In our view, the  major  building blocks in a n  evolutionary account of 
t h e  specificities of national systems of production and innovation a r e  
following. 
Fi rs t ,  t he re  i s  t h e  idea t h a t  f i rms  a r e  a crucial (although not 
exclusive) repositories of knowledge., t o  a large extent  embodied in 
the i r  operational routines, and modified through t ime by the i r  higher 
level ru les  of behaviors and strategies (such as t he i r  search  behaviors 
and the i r  decisions concerning vertical integration and horizontal 
diversification, etc. 1. 
Second, f i rms  themselves a r e  nested in networks of linkages with 
other f i r m s  and also with other non-profit organizations (such as public 
agencies etc.1. These networks, o r  lack of them, enhance o r  limit the  
opportunities facing each f i rm t o  improve the i r  problem-solving 
capabilities. 
Third, national systems entail also a broader notion of 
embeddedness of microeconomic behaviors into a s e t  of social 
relationships, rules and political constraints  (Granovetter (198511. Even 
at a properly micro level, the  momentum associated with single 
l1 See, Cimoli and Dosi (19881, (19901, Chesnais (19931, Ernest  and 
O'Connor (19891, La11 (19841, (19871, (19921, Lundvall (19921, Nelson 
(19931, Zysman (19941. 
technological t ra jec tor ies  is  itself a largely social concept: "it points 
... t o  the  organizations and people committed by various in teres ts  t o  the  
system, t o  manufacturing corporations, research and development 
laboratories, investment banking houses, educational institutions and 
regulatory bodies" (Misa (1991). p.15). And, in turn ,  these in teres ts  and 
institutions a r e  sustained by the  increasing-return and local na ture  of 
most learning activities. Even more so, at a system-level, t h e  
evolutionary interpretat ion presented here is  consistent and indeed 
complementary with institutional approaches building on the  observation 
t h a t  markets  do not exist  o r  operate a p a r t  f rom the  ru les  and 
institutions t h a t  establish them and t h a t  "the institutional s t ruc tu re  of 
the  economy crea tes  a distinct pattern of constraints  and incentives", 
which defines the  in teres ts  of the  ac tors  as well a s  shaping and 
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channeling the i r  behaviours (Zysman (1994) pp. 1 and 2) . 
Paradigms, routines, organizations 
A locus classicus in the  analysis of the  profound intertwining 
between technological learning and organizational change is  certainly 
Alfred Chandler's reconstruction of the  origins of t h e  modern 
multi-divisional ( the  M-form) corporation and i t s  ensuing e f fec t s  on the  
American competitive leadership over several decades (Chandler (19901, 
(1992a) and (1993)). And, as Chandler himself has  recently argued, the re  
a r e  s t r i c t  links between s tory  and evolutionary theories (Chandler 
(1992b). While i t  i s  not  possible t o  enter  into the  richness of the  
Chandlerian analysis here, let  us jus t  recall one of the  main messages: 
"...it was  the  institutionalizing of the  learning involved in 
product and process development t h a t  gave established managerial 
f i rms  advantages over start-ups in the  commercialization of 
technological innovations. Development remained a simple process 
involving a wide variety of usually highly product-specific skills, 
experience and information. I t  required a close interaction between 
functional specialists, such a s  designers, engineers, production 
managers, marketers and managers (. . . 1. Such individuals had t o  
coordinate the i r  activities, particularly during the  scale-up 
processes and the  initial introduction of the  new products on t h e  
l2 Note incidentally t h a t  the  second building block - i.e. networks, etc. 
- in so f a r  as i t  is  equivalent t o  an  externali ty o r  t o  some economy-wide 
mechanism f o r  the  generation of knowledge i s  also captured in a highly 
simplified form by new growth theories. (More on the  general sp i r i t  of 
the  l a t t e r  in Romer (1994a) and (1994b)). Conversely the  f i r s t  and th i rd  
a r e  distinctive of evolutionary/institutionalists analyses. These 
represent  also major  point linkage between evolutionary theories, 
organizational economics and business history. 
market (.. .). Existing 
earnings as a source 
organizational and 
entrepreneurial f irms" 
f i rms  with established core lines had retained 
of inexpensive capital and often had specialized 
technical competence not available t o  new 
(Chandler (1993), p. 37). 
A s  thoroughly argued by Chandler himself, t h i s  organizational 
dynamics can be interpreted as an evolutionary s tory  of competence 
accumulation and development of specific organizational routines 
(Chandler (1992b) 1. 
Did seemingly superior organizational forms spread evenly throughout 
the  world? 
Indeed, the  Chandlerian enterprise diffused, albeit r a t h e r  slowling. 
in other OECD countries (Chandler (1990). Kogut (1992)). However, t h e  
development of organizational forms,  s t ra tegies  and control methods have 
differed f rom nation t o  nation, because of the  difference between 
national environments (Chandler (1992a) p. 283). Moreover, t he  diffusion 
of the  archetypical M-form corporation has been limited t o  around half a 
dozen already developed countries (and even in countries like Italy, i t  
involved very few companies, if any). Similar differences can be found in 
the  processes of international diffusion of American principles of work 
organization -e.g. Taylorism and Fordism- ( fo r  an  analysis of t h e  
Japanese case, see Coriat (1990)). For the  purposes of th is  work, i t  is  
precisely these differences and the  diverse learning pat terns  which they 
entail t h a t  consti tute our primary interest.  
So, f o r  example, a growing l i terature identifies some of the  roo t s  
of t h e  specificities of the  German, the  Japanese o r  the  Italian systems 
of production into the i r  early corporate histories which carried over 
the i r  influence up t o  the  contemporary form of organization and learning 
(see, Chandler (19901, Coriat (19901, Nakagawa (19931, Kogut (19931, 
Dursleifer and Kocka (19931, Dosi, Giannetti and Toninelli (1992)). 
Even more so, one observes quite different  organizational initial 
conditions, different  organizational histories, and together, different  
pa t terns  of learning across  developing countries. Let us consider them at 
some detail.  
During the  las t  th ree  decades, developing countries have shown 
increased technological dynamics associated with a subsequent development 
of the i r  industrial s t ruc tures ,  thus some significant technological 
progress did indeed occur in the  NIEs and some of them also became 
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expor ters  of technology . 
The evolutionary path of technological learning a r e  related t o  both 
the  capacity t o  acquire technologies (capital goods, know how e tc )  and 
the capability t o  absorb these technologies and adopt them t o  the  local 
conditions. In these respects, one has now a good deal of microeconomic/ 
micro technological evidence highlighting the  mechanisms which st imulate 
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and limit endogenous learning in the  NIEs . 
Without doing any justice t o  the richness of these contributions, 
they seem t o  suggest the  existence of some characterist ics in the  paths 
of technological learning a t  the  f i rm level (see also Cimoli (1990) and 
Cimoli and Dosi (1988)). In part icular ,  one might be able t o  identify 
some relatively invariant sequences in the  learning processes, 
conditional on the  initial organizational characterist ics of the  f i r m s  
and the  sec tors  of principal activity. 
A f i r s t  s e t  of regulari t ies regards the  varying combinations between 
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acquisition of outside technologies and endogenous learning . A s  well 
know, the  t r ans fe r  of technology t o  developing economies i s  a common 
source f o r  the  subsequent development of learning capabilities at t h e  
f i rm and sectoral  levels. Possibly with too extreme an  emphasis, Amsden 
and Hikino identify t h e  ability t o  acquire foreign technology as a 
central  characterist ic ,  
"...of l a t e  industrialization at the core of which i s  borrowing 
technology t h a t  has  already been developed by f i rms  in more advanced 
countries. Whereas a driving force behind the  F i r s t  and Second 
Industrial Revolutions was  the  innovation of radically new products 
and processes, no major  technological breakthrough has  been 
associated with late-industrializing economies. The imperative t o  
learn f rom others,  and then realize lower costs ,  higher productivity, 
and be t t e r  quality in mid-tech industries by means of incremental 
l3 See La11 (1982). Teitel (1984) and Teubal (1984). 
l4 See, among others, Bell (19821, Dahlman-Westphal (19821, Hobday (19841, 
Herbert-Copley (19901, Justman-Teubal (19911, Katz (19831, (1984a1, 
(1984b). (1986) and (1987), La11 (1981), (1984), (19921, Kim and Dahlman 
(1992). Teitel (1981). (1984) and (1987). Teubal (19871, Pack and 
Westphal (1986). 
The technology flows t o  developing economies show a rapid expansion in 
the  1960s and 1970s; during the  1980s th i s  process decreased i t s  
intensity (UNCTAD (1991). During the  whole period t h e  Asian countries show 
an increasing role as t he  major recipient of foreign direct  investment 
and capital goods. The f low of capital good t o  Latin American countries 
remain s table  during th is  period. 
improvements, has  given otherwise diverse 20th  century 
industrializer 46 a common s e t  of properties" (Amsden and Hikino 
(1993a, p. 37) . 
A t  a general level, learning pat terns  can be taxonomized according 
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t o  the  relat ive importance of the  corporate activities involved , namely 
a )  the  acquisition of a n  existing technology associated with the paradigm 
prevailing in the  developed world, b)  i t s  adaptation and modification in 
the  local environment and c )  the  creation of new innovation capabilities 
with respect t o  products and processes. 
The importance of the  three  often follows a temporal sequence. 
Already the  modification of the  adopted technology implies learning of 
new production skills which grows through the  adaptation of th i s  
capabilities t o  local specificities. Note, however, t h a t  the re  is  no 
inevitability in the  learning-by-doing process which, on the  contrary,  
requires adequate organization conditions, both within each f i r m  and each 
environment. Interestingly, the  initial characterist ics of corpora te  
organizations appear t o  exe r t  a s t rong influence on subsequent dynamics. 
For example, evidence on the  las t  four  decades (1950-1990) concerning 
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) indicate t h a t  the  evolutionary sequence of organizational and 
technological learning can be distinguished among four  types of f i rms,  
taxonomized mainly in t e rms  of the  nature of ownership: subsidiaries of 
18 MNCs, family f i rms,  large domestic f i rms  and public f i rms  . 
The family f i r m  appears t o  be characterized by a high "propensity t o  
self-sufficiency and self-financing" and the  "mechanical ability of an  
individual", which frequently s tems f rom immigrant entrepreneurs19. The 
technology acquired i s  related t o  the  technical background of the  
entrepreneur and the  initial phase i s  characterized by the  adoption of a 
l6 Although we sha re  the i r  view on the  current  importance of 
technological assimilation of outside technologies, one should not 
underestimate the  degree t o  which th is  occurred also in the  pas t  
experiences of late-coming industrialization and catching-up, f o r  example 
in the  case of the  USA o r  Continental Europe vis-a-vis Britain. 
l7 On a similar point see  Teitel (1987). 
l8 Information on the  d i f ferent  phases of the technological accumulation 
of f i rms  has  been taken f rom the  case studies of the  IDB, ECLA and UNDP 
programmes and f rom the  overviews of the  research findings in Katz 
(19831, (1984a1, (1984b1, ( 1986) and ( 19871, Berlinski, Nosier, Sandoval 
and Turkieh(l982), Teitel(1984) and (19871, Teubal(1987). 
l9 See Katz (1983). 
20 discontinuous mode of production . Ay the  beginning, production is  
characterized by low economies of scale (also as a consequence of t h e  
limitations of t h e  domestic market and the  difficulties in exploiting 
export  possibilities). 
A s o r t  of ideal learning t ra jec tory  fo r  a South American 
family-stablished f i rm t h a t  is technologically progressive (which is  not 
by any means a general characterist ic  of the whole population) would run 
more o r  less a s  follows. First ,  t he  e f fo r t  i s  concentrated on product 
design activities (most likely due t o  the  incentive provided in t h e  pas t  
by import substitution policies), and increasingly, on quality 
improvements and product differentiation. 
Next, at tention is  focused also on process engineering, the  
organization of production and the  exploitation of some economies of 
scale, until ( in some empirically not too frequent cases)  highly 
mechanized production is  achieved. And, along the  process, i t  might 
happen (again, not too often) t h a t  the  organization is  developed beyond 
the  original family hierarchy and "managerialized". 
The s to ry  concerning subsidiaries of foreign f i rms  emerges f rom the  
se t  of cases studies cited earl ier  is  quite different .  The bulk of 
cornpetences and technologies derives from the  parent  company and learning 
mainly concern the  adaptation t o  the local environment, adjustments in 
product mixes and re-scaling of production lines. In some cases, t h i s  
holds throughout the  history of the subsidiary, while in o thers  a n  
outhonomous capability in product and process design is  developed. (Note 
also t h a t  in Latin American foreign subsidiaries tend t o  be concentrated 
in mass production activities like vehicles, consumer durables, food 
processing, etc. 1. 
State-owned f i rms  display yet another archetypical learning story. 
20 Two alternative modes of organizing production namely, cont inuous  and 
discontinuous,  appear t o  be relevant f o r  the  analysis of learning 
patterns. Continuous methods imply 1) specialization of production along 
precise product lines; 2) production planing f o r  each line of business; 
3) relatively high scale economies; 4) relatively low flexibility in 
product design and r a t e s  of through put. Conversely, discontinuous 
methods involve 1) low standardization of production; 2) low economies of 
scale; 3) t he  organization of production intomulti-product "shops"; 4)  
general purpuse, low cost  machinery. I t  is  remarkable t h a t  in many Latin 
American examples, at least until t he  80's  (but not in F a r  Eastern ones) 
incremental learning appeared t o  be more successful in discontinuous 
batch-production a s  compared t o  continuous and mass-production activities 
(such as chemicals, many consumer durables, etc) .  
Firs t ,  they have been concentrated in sectors t h a t  have tended t o  be 
considered "strategic" and often happened t o  be continuous process 
industries such as bulk materials, steel,  basic petrochemicals, in 
addition -in some countries- t o  aerospace and military production. 
Second, the  s t ra tegies  have generally be dictated also by political 
considerations. Third, learning has often s t a r t ed  via agreements with 
international suppliers of equipment. In the  "healthy" scenario -which 
i s  not the  rule- international technology t r ans fe r  agreement became more 
sophisticated, involving adaptation of plants and technologies t o  local 
circumstances, while the  emphasis was kept on personnel training and 
learning by using. Finally, autonomous capabilities of plant  upgrading 
and process engineering were sometimes developed. 
A s  regards  large domestic f i rms,  i t  i s  hard t o  t r a c e  any modal 
patterns.  Scanning through the  case studies, they sometime appear t o  
follow pat terns  not too d i f ferent  from the  family f i rms,  in o ther  cases 
they seem t o  perform like Eas t  Asian business groups (see below), and yet  
in o thers  learning appears  t o  be much more directed toward the  
exploitation of political r en t s  and financial opportunities r a t h e r  then 
technological accumulation. 
I t  i s  interesting t o  compare these sketchy Latin American "corporate 
t ra jec tor ies"  with o ther  experiences, such as t he  Korean one21. To make a 
long and variegated s tory  very short ,  in Korea i t  seems t h a t  t h e  major  
ac tors  in technological learning have been large business groups -& 
chaebols- which have been able at a very early s tage  of development t o  
internalize the  skills f o r  the  selection among technologies acquired f rom 
abroad, the i r  eff icient  use and adaptation, and, not much later ,  have 
been able t o  grow impressive engineering capabilities. 
Conversely, the  Taiwanese organizational learning has  rested much 
more in large networks of small and medium f i rms  very open t o  t h e  
international markets  and often developing production capabilities which 
complement those of f i r s t  world companies (Dahlman and Sananikone (19901, 
Ernest  and O'Connor (1989) 1. 
This impressionistic l is t  of stylized organizational pa t terns  of 
learning could be of course very lengthy. For our  purposes, i t  should be 
understood only as an  illustration of the  multiplicity of evolutionary 
21 AS discussed at grea te r  depth in Amsden (1989). Amsden and Hikino 
(1993a and b) ,  Enos and Park  (1988), Bell and Pavit t  (19931, La11 (19921, 
Kim, Westphal and Dahlman (1985). 
paths t h a t  organizational learning can take. The fundamental point here 
is t h a t  the  ra tes  and directions of learning a r e  not a t  all indipendent 
from the  ways corporate organizations emerge, change, develop particular 
problem-solving, capabilities, diversify, etc. I t  is the  core 
co-evolutionary view emphasized by Nelson ( 1994). 
The analysis in term of paradigms, trajecories,  technological 
asymmetries, etc. outlined in the  f i r s t  pa r t  of th is  paper i s  the  most 
abs t rac t  level of description of production pattern and technical change, 
whereby the "primitives" of the analysis itself a r e  entities like "bits 
of knowledge" and the outcomes of their  implementation in the  spaces of 
production process and output characteristics. However, knowledge is  t o  a 
large extent  embodied, reproduced and augmented within specific 
organizations. Thus, a lot of the  action is reflected in the  behaviours, 
evolution and learning of these organizations -in primis, business firms. 
A t  this  level, evolutionary analyses match and cross-fertilize with 
investigations on organizational dynamics, industrial demography and 
business history. 
Inter-sectoral networks and production capacity 
Of course the  multiple business histories of learning and 
organizational change (or lack of them) in each country, as mentioned 
earl ier ,  is  nested into flows of commodities and knowledge across 
different  sectors and different  institutional actors. At th is  level, can 
one identify some broad regularities in the  processes of 
system-construction. 
I t  i s  useful t o  maintain the distinction emphasized by Bell and 
Pavitt (1993) (which indeed bears some Listian flavour!] between the  
development of a "production capacity" and of "technological 
capabilities". Production capacity concerns the  stocks of resources, the  
nature  of capital-embodied technologies, labour skills, product and input 
specification and the  organizational routines in use. Technological 
capabilities r e s t  on the  knowledge and resources requested f o r  the  
generation and management of technical change. 
These seem t o  be some patterns,  albeit r a the r  loose, in the  
development of a national production capacity. For example, practically 
every country starts with manufacturing of clothing and textile, possibly 
natural  resource processing, and moves on -if i t  does- t o  more complex 
and knowledge intensive activities. However, the  tricky question is 
whether there  a r e  some activities which hold a special s t a tus  in the  
construction of a national system of production and innovation, also due 
t o  the  property t h a t  having a production capacity in them makes i t  
easier ,  other things being equal, t o  develop technological capabilities. 
The conjecture is  quite old (and goes back at least t o  List,  Fe r r i e r  and 
Hamilton) and is present in contemporary notions such those of filiere o r  
Dahmen's "development blocks", but i t  might gain s t rength  on the  grounds 
22 
of the  evolutionary microeconomics outlined above . 
Whenever one abandons a view of development exclusively shaped by 
endowments, the  degrees of perfection of market signals, and the  like, 
but focuses on the  conditions f o r  technological/organizational learning, 
then i t  also becomes easier  t o  appreciate the  diversity of the  sources in 
learning opportunities and the i r  different  economic potentials. 
In f a c t ,  t he re  is  a good circumstantial evidence f rom contemporary 
as well as previous late-industrializing countries ( s u c h  as ,  in the i r  
days, the  USA, Germany, the  Scandinavian countries, Japan, etc.). 
Suggesting t h a t  there  a r e  technologies whose domains of application a r e  
so wide and the i r  role has  been so  crucial t h a t  the  pat tern  of technical 
change of each country depends t o  a large degree on the  national 
capabilities in mastering production/ imitation/innovation in a s e t  of 
crucial knowledge a r e a s  (eg, in the  past ,  mechanical engineering, 
electricity and electrical devices, and nowadays, also information 
technologies). Moreover, t he  linkages among production activi t ies embody 
s t ructured hierarchies whereby the  most dynamic technological paradigms 
play a fundamental role as sources of technologicaI skills, 
problem-solving opportunities and productivity improvementsZ3. Thus, these 
core technologies shape the  overall absolute advantages/disadvantages of 
each country. In other words, the  pattern of technical change of each 
country in these technologies does not average out  with t h e  technological 
capabilities in other activities but a r e  complementary t o  them. These 
core technologies of ten  also imply basic inf ras t ructures  and networks 
common t o  a wide range of activities (such as ,  f o r  example, t h e  
electricity grid,  the  road system, telecommunications and more recently 
the  information network). Many pieces of empirical evidence strongly 
convey the  idea t h a t  a proper technological dynamism in developing 
22 Classic contributions on the  importance of intersectoral linkages a r e  
Dahmen (1971) and Hirschman (1992). 
See Rosenberg (19761, and, f o r  contemporary la te  comers, Chudnovsky, 
Nagao and Jacobsson (1984) and Fransman (1986). 
countries is  impossible without major structural  changes and a sequential 
construction of a widening manufacturing sector involving also indigenous 
skills in a se t  of "core" technologies. 
We do not a t  al l  suggest t h a t  there  is any invariant sequence of 
industrial sec tors  which account f o r  the upgrading of national 
technological capabilitiesZ4. However, one might st i l l  be able t o  identify 
some rough sequences in the  predominant modes of technological learning. 
In th i s  respect, the  taxonomy of the  sectoral pa t terns  of acquisition of 
innovative knowledge suggested by Pavitt (1984) is  a good -albeit 
somewhat theoretically fuzzy- point of departure. As known, Pavit t  
distinguishes four  groups of industrial sectors, namely ( i )  s u p p l i e r  
dominated -where innovations mainly enter  as exogenously generated 
changes in capital and intermediate good, and where learning is  primarely 
associated with adoption and production skills-; ( i i )  spec ia l i zed  
s u p p l i e r s  -providing equipment and instruments t o  the  industrial system, 
and relying in the i r  innovative activities on both formal (more o r  less 
scientific) knowledge and more tac i t  one based also on the  user-producer 
relationships-; (iii) scale-intensive s e c t o r s  -whose innovative abilities 
draw, jointly, on t h e  development/adoption of innovative equipment, on 
the  design of complex products, on the  exploitation of some scale 
economies, and on the  ability of mastering complex organizations-; (iv) 
science-based s e c t o r s  -whose innovative opportunities link more directly 
with advances in basic research. 
The important issue here is  whether one may use t h a t  taxonomy in 
order  t o  detect  some pat terns  over t h e  development process. The emergence 
of manufacturing sector is  generally characterized by an  initial s tage  
where supplier-dominated sec tors  dominate accompanied by the  emergence of 
specialized suppliers. The process of technical change in these sec tors  
i s  characterized by a sequential development of various fo rms  of t ac i t  
and incremental learning related t o  the  t r ans fe r  and acquisition of 
foreign technology. These learning activities a r e  mainly related t o  the  
use of equipment, development of engineering skills in 
machine-transformation, adaptation of existing machines and f inal  
products t o  specific environmental conditions. 
24 Indeed, any detailed comparison of the  sectoral  composition of output 
of e.g. USA, Germany, Japan, France, Italy between 1850 and 1950, o r  
Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, and Singapore between 1950 and 1990 -we 
conjecture- would show enough dispersion. 
The emergence of "scale-intensive" industries entai ls  fu r the r  forms 
of learning related t o  the  development and use of capital  equipment. 
Moreover, unlike the  supplier-dominated sectors, technological e f fo r t s  
a r e  also focused on ( i )  the  development of technological synergies 
between production and use of innovations, often internalized via 
horizontal and vertical integration; ( i i )  the exploitation of s t a t i c  and 
dynamic economies of scale; (iii 1 the establishment of formal 
institutions undertaking search (typically, corporate R&D laboratories), 
and complementary t o  informal learning and diffusion of technological 
knowledge. 
Sectoral learning pat terns  a r e  clearly nested into broader ("macro") 
conditions such as those definining the educational system. For example, 
in "supplier-dominated" and "specialized supplier" sectors,  a significant 
role is  played by the  levels of literacy and skills of the  workforce, and 
the  skills and technical competence of engineers and designers in the  
mechanical and (increasingly) electronics fields. In scale-intensive 
sectors,  the  existence of managers capable of efficiently running complex 
organizations is also likely be important. In science based sectors,  the  
quality of higher education and research capabilities is  obviously 
relevant. 
Moreover, sectoral learning patterns and overall national 
capabilities a r e  dynamically coupled via input-output flows, 
knowledge-spillovers, complementarities and context-specif ic 
externali t ieZ5. Together, they contribute t o  shape the  organizational and 
technological context within which each economic activity takes place. In 
a sense, they se t  the  opportunities and constraints facing each 
individual process of production and innovation -including the  
availability of complementary skills, information on intermediate inputs 
and capital goods, and demand stimuli t o  improve part icular  products. 
This links straightforwardly with the  analyses focusing on 
s t ructura l  change and development (here within a vast  l i terature,  
An obvious question concerns the  unit of analysis t o  which these 
externali t ies and system effect  apply. Why shouldn't international t r ade  
compensate f o r  spatially circumscribed specificities? What i s  unique of a 
nation distinguishing i t  from a geographical region, or  a f irm, o r  a 
group of individuals? Far  from any intent t o  reduce the  importance of 
other levels of description (e.g. regional dynamics), we maintain tha t  
nations a r e  also specified by particular modes of institutional 
governance which extent-make them diverse auto- reproducing entities. 
contributions t h a t  come inmediately t o  mind range f rom Hirschman t o  
Rosenstein Rodan, Gerschenkron, Prebisch -notwithstanding his  sometimes 
extremistinterpretations-, Lowe, Kuznets, Chenery, Sirquin among others) .  
Certanly, the  dynamics of development also r e s t  upon major  s t ruc tu ra l  
t ransformations which entai l  a changing importance of d i f ferent  branches 
of economic activity as generators of both technological/organizational 
innovations and demand impulses. So, f o r  example, in this  interpretat ive 
framework, i t  does not sound so outragions t o  conjecture t h a t  the  
"quality" ( in t e rms  of technological opportunities and demand 
elasticities) of any one s t ructure  of production and export  is  bound t o  
influence the  relat ive ability of a country t o  absorve i t s  labour supply, 
meet i t s  foreign balance constraints, grow in i t s  per  capi ta  income ... A t  
th is  level of analysis, one empirically finds, f o r  example, t h a t  lat in 
American Countries have increasingly biased the i r  s t ruc tu re  of 
production, in t h e  go's, in favour of resource-based sectors,  while Eas t  
Asian NICs have move toward scale-intensive and science-base sectors.  
Obviously, in some ideal General Equilibrium world, all t h i s  i s  jus t  an  
irrelevant epiphenomenon. Conversely, under the  microfoundation sketched 
above, the re  might be reasons t o  worry (even if naive technologically 
deterministic conclusions should be obviously discussed). Indeed, some 
fundamental trade-off between "stat ic  allocative efficiency" and "dynamic 
efficiency" of any one pat tern  of production might plausibly emerge (more 
on al l  t h i s  in Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) and Dosi, Tyson and Zysman 
(1989)). 
Moreover, t h e  specificities of each system of production in terac t  
with those of each national system of innovation -as throughly analyzed 
in Nelson (1993)- and tend t o  yield recognizeable national pa t terns  o r  
t ra jec tor ies  shaped by the  institutions supporting technical advances and 
reproduced through t ime also by processes of lock-in into part icular  
knowledge bases, corporate organizations and sectoral  specialization. 
4 From micro  technological paradigms t o  nat ional  sys tems of 
product ion and  innovation: some ten ta t ive  conclusions and  many 
r e s e a r c h  avenues  
The third major element, mentioned earl ier  linking microeconomic 
learning with national pat terns  of development was the  embeddedness of 
the thread of incentives, constraints, forms of corporate organization 
into the broader institutional framework of the political economy of each 
country. I t  i s  beyond the  scope of this  paper t o  discuss tha t  issue at 
any satisfactory detail. For our purposes, let us just  mention t h a t  the  
micro- and meso-economic theoretical building blocks sketched above and 
drawn f rom an evolutionary perspective a r e  in principle consistent with 
broader institutionalist analyses of national systems of production, 
innovation and governance of socio-economic relations. Indeed, one can 
see multiple links which one is  only beginning t o  explore. For example, 
an  evolutionary perspective is  quite a t  ease with the  idea tha t  markets 
a r e  themselves "social constructs" which -depending on thei r  rules and 
organizing principles- shape microbehaviours and adjustment mechanisms. 
The emphasis on patterned and local learning, and bounded rationaly 
assumptions, go well together with the view of political economists and 
sociologists of development according t o  which a major ingredient of 
development i s  the  process of change in social norms, expectations and 
forms of collective organization. The patterns of socio-economic 
Regulation (Boyer (1988a) and (1988b)) can be in princinple microfounded 
into underlying evolutionary processes of self-organization, learning and 
selection. In fac t ,  there  seem t o  be a large domain where more 
"bottom-up" evolutionary theories and more "top-down" institutional 
analyses can develop a f ru i t fu l  dialogue. 
Notions like those of technological trajectories,  path-dependencies, 
organizational competences, self-organization, learning and selection 
dynamics -and many others stemming from evolutionary investigations- a r e  
becoming p a r t  of the  tool-kit of many social disciplines. As regards more 
specifically development issue, they start becoming building blocks which 
might provide f i rmer  grounds t o  the broad intuitions of an  earl ier  
generation of development theorists  -from Myrdal t o  Hirschman, f rom 
Rosenstein-Rodan t o  Gerschenkron.. .In this  respect our tour  de force  f rom 
technological paradigms t o  national systems should just  be considered as 
a tentative roadmap over still largely unexplored terrains.  
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